Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem

Don’t stress, Kurt, it’s easy!

Proving the famous “Gödel Incompleteness Theorems” is easy if you use computer science.

It’s a Great Application of Theoretical Computer Science to mathematics.

It’s so easy, let’s spend some time learning and reviewing

First Order Logic:

stuff like \( \forall x (\neg(x=a) \rightarrow \text{Smarter(Father(a),Father(x)))}. \)

Given a vocabulary, some sentences are “tautologies”:

i.e., “true for all possible interpretations”, “automatically true, for ‘purely logical’ reasons”.

\[ \begin{align*}
\forall x \forall y (x=a \land y=b) & \rightarrow (\text{Func}(x,y)=\text{Func}(a,b)) \\
\text{IsCool}(c) & \rightarrow (\exists x \text{IsCool}(x))
\end{align*} \]
Gödel’s **Completeness** Theorem (1929):

“There’s a (computable) Deductive Calculus for tautologies.”

This “Deductive Calculus” has:

- a bunch of axioms, (all of which are obviously tautologies);
- one deduction rule: from A and A→B, deduce B.

Everything deducible is a tautology. Gödel showed: every tautology is deducible.

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Gödel’s **Completeness** Theorem (1929):

“There’s a (computable) Deductive Calculus for tautologies.”

Actually, Deductive Calculus does not have finitely many axioms. It has finitely many “axiom schema”. For example...

- “If A is any sentence, then A v ¬A is an axiom”
- “If IsR is any relation-name and c is any constant-name, then IsR(c) → (∃x IsR(x)) is an axiom”

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Gödel’s **Completeness** Theorem (1929):

“There’s a (computable) Deductive Calculus for tautologies.”

“Computability”:

- There’s an algorithm (say, a TM) which, given a sentence, decides if it is an axiom.

- “If A is any sentence, then A v ¬A is an axiom”
- “If IsR is any relation-name and c is any constant-name, then IsR(c) → (∃x IsR(x)) is an axiom”
Upshot of the Completeness Thm.

Corollary:
There is a TM algorithm which, given a \textit{tautological} sentence \( S \), finds a \textit{deduction} of it in the Deductive Calculus.

Proof:
for \( k = 1, 2, 3, \ldots \)
for all strings \( x \) of length \( k \),
check if \( x \) is a deduction of \( S \)

The set of tautologies is interesting, but it’s not \textit{THAT} interesting.

More typical use of first order logic:
1. Think of some universe you want to reason about.
2. Invent an appropriate vocabulary
   (constant, function, relation names).
3. ADD in some computable axioms (schemas)
   which are true under the interpretation you have in mind.
4. See what these axioms \textit{entail}.
   (By Gödel’s theorem, equivalent to what you can \textit{deduce} from the axioms in Deductive Calculus.)

Ex. 1: Arithmetic of \( \mathbb{N} \) (Peano axioms)

\textbf{constant-name:} \( 0 \)

\textbf{function-names:} \( \text{Successor}(x) \)
\( \text{Plus}(x,y) \)
\( \text{Times}(x,y) \)

\textbf{extra axioms:}
\( \forall x \neg(\text{Successor}(x)=0) \)
\( \forall x \forall y (\text{Successor}(x)=\text{Successor}(y)) \rightarrow (x=y) \)
\( \forall x \text{ Plus}(x,0)=x \)
\( \forall x \forall y \text{ Plus}(x,\text{Successor}(y))=\text{Successor} (\text{Plus}(x,y)) \)
\( \forall x \text{ Times}(x,0)=0 \)
\( \forall x \forall y \text{ Times}(x,\text{Successor}(y))=\text{Plus}(\text{Times}(x,y),x) \)

“Induction:” For any parameterized formula \( F(x) \),
\( (F(0) \land (\forall x F(x) \rightarrow F(\text{Successor}(x)))) \rightarrow \forall x F(x) \)
Ex. 2: Set Theory (ZFC axioms)

constant-names, function-names: none
relation-name: IsElementOf(x,y) ['x ∈ y']

extra axioms, catchily known as ‘ZFC’:

∀x ∀y ( (∀z z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y )
∀x ∀y ∃z ( x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z )
... 7 more (computable) axioms & schemas ...

ZFC: standard basic axioms (of set theory) that can be used to model and prove almost anything in mathematics

How would you state/prove some theorem about random walks on graphs??

First, define natural numbers in terms of sets.
Next, define ordered pairs in terms of sets.
Next, define graphs in terms of pairs.
Next, define Z in terms of pairs (N, -).
Next, define Q in terms of (Z, Z).
Next, define functions in terms of pairs.
Next, define infinite sequences in terms of functions of N.
Next, define R in terms of infinite sequences from Q.
Next, make some basic definitions for probability theory.
Finally, state the theorem you want to prove.

Bertrand Russell Alfred Whitehead

Principia Mathematica, ca. 1912

Developed set theory, number theory, some real analysis using set theory & FOL.

page 379: "1+1=2"
It became generally agreed that you could rigorously formalize pretty much all mathematical proofs.

But nobody wants to!
(by hand, at least)

Computer-assisted proof

Proof assistant software like HOL Light, Mizar, Coq, Isabelle, does two things:

1. Checks that a proof encoded in ZFC + Deductive Calculus for First Order Logic is valid.

2. Helps user code up such proofs.

Developing proof assistants is an active area of research, particularly at CMU!

Computer-formalized proofs

Fundamental Theorem of Calculus (Harrison)
Fundamental Theorem of Algebra (Milewski)
Prime Number Theorem (Avigad++ @ CMU)
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem (Shankar)
Jordan Curve Theorem (Hales)
Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem (Harrison)
Four Color Theorem (Gonthier)
Feit-Thompson Theorem (Gonthier)
Kepler Conjecture (Hales)
Remember:
There is a TM which will print out and certify
a proof of, say, the Four Color Theorem,
coded up in ZFC+Deductive Calculus.

for k = 1, 2, 3, ...
for all strings P of length k,
check if P is a valid deduction of 4CT

15-251: Great Theoretical Ideas in Computer Science

Turing & Computability

Decidable languages

Definition:
A language $L \subseteq \Sigma^*$ is **decidable** if there is
a Turing Machine $M$ which:

1. **Halts on every input** $x \in \Sigma^*$.
2. Accepts inputs $x \in L$ and rejects inputs $x \notin L$. 
The Halting Problem is Undecidable

Turing’s Theorem:
Let HALTS ⊆ \{0,1\}^* be the language
{ ⟨M,x⟩ : M is a TM which halts on input x }. Then HALTS is undecidable.

It’s not: “we don’t know how to solve it efficiently”.
It’s not: “we don’t know if it’s a solvable problem”.
We know that it is unsolvable by any algorithm.

Proof
Assume M_{HALTS} is a decider TM which decides HALTS.

Here is the description of another TM called D,
which uses M_{HALTS} as a subroutine:

D:
Given as input ⟨M⟩, the encoding of a TM M:
D executes M_{HALTS} (⟨M, ⟨M⟩⟩).
If this call accepts, D enters an infinite loop.
If this call rejects, D halts (say, it accepts).

By definition, D(D) loops if it halts and halts if it loops.

Contradiction.

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Gödel’s Incompleteness

Theorem

Don’t stress,
Kurt, it’s easy!
Suppose you just really cannot believe we proved that HALTS is undecidable.

How would you try to write a program H which, on input (M,x), decides if M(x) eventually halts?

Sample input:

M = “for k = 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, ... 
    if k is not the sum of 2 primes then HALT.”

X = \epsilon \quad (empty string)

Dunno. Best idea I can think of is: Let H simulate M(x). If M(x) halts after 1,000,000,000 steps, output “it halts”. If M(x) still hasn’t halted after 1,000,000,000 steps, um...

How would you try to write a program H which, on input (M,x), decides if M(x) eventually halts?

Sample input:

M = “for k = 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, ... 
    if k is not the sum of 2 primes then HALT.”

X = \epsilon \quad (empty string)

I have a crazy and sort of awesome idea for how to write H.

Kurt, you mathematicians always make things too complicated. Let me explain it.

All right, fine.
How would you try to write a program H which, on input \(\langle M, x \rangle\), decides if \(M(x)\) eventually halts?

**Idea for H:**

```
“ for k = 1, 2, 3, ...
    for all strings P of length k,
        • Check if P is a valid ZFC + Deductive Calculus proof of the statement ‘M(x) eventually halts’
          If so, let H halt and output ‘yes, M(x) halts’
        • Check if P is a valid ZFC + Deductive Calculus proof of the statement ‘M(x) eventually loops’
          If so, let H halt and output ‘no, M(x) loops’
```

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*By my theorem: this TM H, like all algorithms, does not decide the Halting Problem.*

**Idea for H:**

```
“ for k = 1, 2, 3, ...
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        • Check if P is a valid ZFC + Deductive Calculus proof of the statement ‘M(x) eventually halts’
          If so, let H halt and output ‘yes, M(x) halts’
        • Check if P is a valid ZFC + Deductive Calculus proof of the statement ‘M(x) eventually loops’
          If so, let H halt and output ‘no, M(x) loops’
```

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**Conclusion:**

There is some TM \(M\) and some string \(x\) such that ZFC+Deductive Calculus cannot prove either of ‘\(M(x)\) eventually halts’ or ‘\(M(x)\) eventually loops’.

But \(M(x)\) either halts or it loops!
One of these two statements is true!

→ **There is a true mathematical statement that cannot be proved** (in ZFC+Deductive Calculus).
This is basically Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem.

“for k = 1, 2, 3, ...
for all strings P of length k,
• Check if P is a valid ZFC + Deductive Calculus proof of the statement ‘M(x) eventually halts’
  If so, let H halt and output “yes, M(x) halts”
• Check if P is a valid ZFC + Deductive Calculus proof of the statement ‘M(x) eventually loops’
  If so, let H halt and output “no, M(x) halts” ”

Conclusion:
There is some TM M and some string x such that ZFC+Deductive Calculus cannot prove either of ‘M(x) eventually halts’ or ‘M(x) eventually loops’.

Actually, this is not a correct conclusion, because there’s another possibility:

ZFC+Deductive Calculus might have a proof that ‘M(x) eventually halts’ even though it loops,
or ‘M(x) eventually loops’ even though it halts.

Conclusion:
There is some TM M and some string x such that ZFC+Deductive Calculus cannot prove either of ‘M(x) eventually halts’ or ‘M(x) eventually loops’.
Actually, this is not a correct conclusion, because there’s another possibility:

ZFC+Deductive Calculus might have a proof that ‘M(x) eventually halts’ even though it loops, or ‘M(x) eventually loops’ even though it halts.

I.e., ZFC might be **unsound**: it might prove some false statements.

This would kind of upend all of mathematics. Now, almost everyone believes ZFC is sound. But theoretically, it’s a possibility.

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**What we’ve actually proven so far:**

ZFC + Deductive Calculus cannot be both **complete** and **sound**.

**Complete:**
for every sentence S, either S or ¬S is provable.

**Sound:**
for every S, if S is provable then S is true.

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**What we’ve actually proven so far:**

ZFC + Deductive Calculus cannot be both **complete** and **sound**.

**Question:**
What did this proof use about ZFC?

**Answer:** Not too much.
• You can define TM’s and TM computation in it.
• Its axioms/axiom schemas are computable.
Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem:

Any mathematical proof system which is “sufficiently expressive” (can define TM’s) and has computable axioms cannot be both complete and sound.

Side remark:
Even Peano Arithmetic is “sufficiently expressive”. You can define TM’s and TM computation in it, though it is a pain in the neck.

A smart-aleck’s attempt to circumvent Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem:

“Let’s assume ZFC is sound. Gödel’s Theorem says that there’s some true statement S which can’t be proved in ZFC. Let’s just upgrade ZFC by adding S as an axiom!”

Doesn’t help:
ZFC+S is a sufficiently expressive system with computable axioms. So by Gödel’s Theorem, there’s still some other S’ which is true but can’t be proved.

A smart-aleck’s attempt to circumvent Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem:

“Maybe add in S’ as another axiom?”

Still doesn’t help:
Apply Gödel’s Theorem to ZFC+S+S’, get yet another true statement S’/ which is true but cannot be proved.

“Maybe add in all true statements as axioms?”
Okay fine, but now the set of axioms is not computable. So it’s kind of a pointless system.
Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem:

**Any** mathematical proof system which is “sufficiently expressive” (can define TM’s) and has **computable axioms** cannot be both **complete** and **sound**.

**Sound:**
for every S, if S is provable then S is **true**.

Whoahhh, dude. How can you say a statement S is true if you can’t prove it?

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**Response 1**

Don’t get all confused. If I asked you yesterday,

“Hey, is it **true** that 1 is the only number which appears in Pascal’s Triangle more than ten times?”,

you wouldn’t be, like,

“Whoahhh dude, what does **true** mean?”

Ordinary mathematical concepts and reasoning don’t suddenly become invalid just because you’re studying logic.

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**Response 2**

Just so that nobody gets confused, I’ll prove an even stronger version which doesn’t mention “truth”. 
Gödel's 1st: full version
(with strengthening by J. Barkley Rosser)

Any mathematical proof system which is "sufficiently expressive" (can define TM's) and has computable axioms cannot be both complete and consistent.

Complete:
for every sentence S, either S or ¬S is provable.

Consistent:
for every S, you can't prove both S and ¬S.

Not only will we prove this, there will be a bonus plot twist at the end!

For simplicity, we fix the mathematical proof system to be ZFC.

Outline of previous proof:
1. Assume ZFC sound.
2. Reason about a certain TM.
3. Deduce that ZFC is incomplete.

Outline of upcoming stronger proof:
1. Assume ZFC consistent.
2. Reason about a certain TM.
3. Deduce that ZFC is incomplete.
We’re going to need a lemma.

Some statements are so simple that, assuming they’re true, they definitely do have a proof in ZFC.

Example: “There are 25 primes less than 100.”

This definitely has a proof: the brute-force, brain-dead enumeration proof!

Our Brain-Dead Lemma:
If a particular TM has a particular t-step execution trace, then there is a proof of this fact (in ZFC).

Why? Can always write (in ZFC) proofs that look like:

“Initially M in the starting state/head/tape configuration.
After 1 step, M is in state/head/tape configuration blah.
After 2 steps, M is in state/head/tape configuration blah.
After 3 steps, M is in state/head/tape configuration blah.
... After t steps, M is in state/head/tape configuration blah.
QED.”

In particular, if M(x) halts, there is a proof of ‘M(x) halts’.

Outline of upcoming proof of the “truth”-free stronger version of Gödel’s 1st:

1. Assume ZFC consistent.
2. Reason about a certain TM.
3. Deduce that ZFC is incomplete.
Proof of stronger Incompleteness Theorem

Assume ZFC consistent.

Let $D$ be the TM which on input $(M)$ does:
for all strings $P$ of length 1, 2, 3, ...
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of "$M(\langle M \rangle)$ halts", enter 'go right forever' state.
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of "$M(\langle M \rangle)$ loops", then halt.

What can ZFC prove about $D(\langle D \rangle)$? By consistency, 
at most one of 'D(\langle D \rangle) halts' or 'D(\langle D \rangle) loops'.

Perhaps ZFC can prove 'D(\langle D \rangle) loops'? Then $D$ on input $\langle D \rangle$ will find this proof, and thus halt. But if $D(\langle D \rangle)$ halts then ZFC can prove 'D(\langle D \rangle) halts' (by Brain-Dead Lemma). This contradicts consistency.

Proof of stronger Incompleteness Theorem

Assume ZFC consistent.

Let $D$ be the TM which on input $(M)$ does:
for all strings $P$ of length 1, 2, 3, ...
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of "$M(\langle M \rangle)$ halts", enter 'go right forever' state.
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of "$M(\langle M \rangle)$ loops", then halt.

What can ZFC prove about $D(\langle D \rangle)$? By consistency, 
at most one of 'D(\langle D \rangle) halts' or 'D(\langle D \rangle) loops'.

Perhaps ZFC can prove 'D(\langle D \rangle) halts'? Then $D(\langle D \rangle)$ will run for some $t$ steps, find this proof, and then enter the 'go right forever' state. But by Brain-Dead Lemma, there's a proof of this fact (the $t+1$ step execution trace). Thus ZFC can prove 'D(\langle D \rangle) loops', contradicting consistency.

Proof of stronger Incompleteness Theorem

Assume ZFC consistent.

Let $D$ be the TM which on input $(M)$ does:
for all strings $P$ of length 1, 2, 3, ...
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of "$M(\langle M \rangle)$ halts", enter 'go right forever' state.
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of "$M(\langle M \rangle)$ loops", then halt.

Great! We just showed ZFC cannot prove either 'D(\langle D \rangle) loops' or 'D(\langle D \rangle) halts'. So ZFC is incomplete. ☐

Incidentally... does $D(\langle D \rangle)$ actually halt or loop?
It loops. It does not find a proof of either statement.
Proof of stronger Incompleteness Theorem

Assume ZFC consistent.

Let $D$ be the TM which on input $(M)$ does:
for all strings $P$ of length 1, 2, 3, ...
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of ‘$M(M)$ halts’, enter ‘go right forever’ state.
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of ‘$M(M)$ loops’, then halt.

Great! We just showed ZFC cannot prove either ‘$D((D))$ loops’ or ‘$D((D))$ halts’. So ZFC is incomplete. □

Wait a minute.  
It loops. It does not find a proof of either statement.

Proof of stronger Incompleteness Theorem

Assume ZFC consistent.

Let $D$ be the TM which on input $(M)$ does:
for all strings $P$ of length 1, 2, 3, ...
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of ‘$M(M)$ halts’, enter ‘go right forever’ state.
- if $P$ is a ZFC proof of ‘$M(M)$ loops’, then halt.

Great! We just showed ZFC cannot prove either ‘$D((D))$ loops’ or ‘$D((D))$ halts’. So ZFC is incomplete. □

Wait a minute.  We just showed that $D((D))$ loops.
If we formalize the last 3 slides in ZFC,  
we get a proof of ‘$D((D))$ loops’.

Did we just find a contradiction in mathematics?
Proof of stronger Incompleteness Theorem

Assume ZFC consistent.

Let $D$ be the TM which on input $(M)$ does:
for all strings $P$ of length 1, 2, 3, ...
  • If $P$ is a ZFC proof of 'M((M)) halts', enter 'go right forever' state.
  • If $P$ is a ZFC proof of 'M((M)) loops', then halt.

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Wait a minute. We just showed that D((D)) loops.

If we formalize the last 3 slides in ZFC, we get a proof of 'ZFC consistent → D((D)) loops'.

Proof of stronger Incompleteness Theorem

Assume ZFC consistent.

Let $D$ be the TM which on input $(M)$ does:
for all strings $P$ of length 1, 2, 3, ...
  • If $P$ is a ZFC proof of 'M((M)) halts', enter 'go right forever' state.
  • If $P$ is a ZFC proof of 'M((M)) loops', then halt.

Great! We just showed ZFC cannot prove either 'D((D)) loops' or 'D((D)) halts'. So ZFC is incomplete. □

Wait a minute. We just showed that D((D)) loops.

If we formalize the last 3 slides in ZFC, we get a proof of 'ZFC consistent → D((D)) loops'.

The only way to avoid a contradiction:

ZFC cannot prove 'ZFC consistent'

If we formalize the last 3 slides in ZFC, we get a proof of 'ZFC consistent → D((D)) loops'.
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem
(proved independently by von Neumann)

Assume ZFC (or any “sufficiently expressive” proof system) is consistent. Then not only is it incomplete, here’s a true statement it cannot prove: “ZFC is consistent”.

Assuming ZFC is consistent, here’s another statement which cannot be proved or disproved in ZFC:

There is a set A with \(|\mathbb{N}| < |A| < |\mathbb{R}|\).

i.e., the continuous hypothesis is independent from ZFC.

Paul Cohen (1963)

The statement and proof of Gödel’s First and Second Incompleteness Theorems.

Study Guide